Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
. Not surprisingly, the problem of why, when, and under which circumstances, governments engage in market-oriented reforms, such as a liberalization of product and factor markets, an elimination of trade barriers, a stabilization from high inflation, a sustainable budget consolidation, fighting public sector corruption or improving property rights enforcement, has attracted enormous attention in the literature.
In that context, the relationship between political institutions, economic performance, and policy reform is of particular interest. Notably with respect to developing countries, there is a controversy about pros and cons of autocratic or democratic rule to implement economic policy liberalization. Another disputed question is whether economic crises promote major market-friendly policy changes, as is often hypothesized, or if, and under which conditions, a good state of the economy would be more favorable for economic reform implementation.
See the surveys by Rodrik (1996) and Drazen (2000) .
Most empirical studies have explored the links between democracy and liberalization, and between crisis and reform, separately. The purpose of this paper is to investigate more deeply the possible interaction between economic performance and democratic institutions in producing free-market reform. In particular, we aim to explore if the regime type shapes systematically government responses to good or bad growth performance, using new panel econometric techniques and recently updated data for economic reform and political institutions. Contrary to conventional thinking we find that a bad GDP growth performance stimulates reforms only in democracies. Democratic rule seems to be favorable for freemarket reform in general and also in times of crisis, but a very good growth performance weakens liberalization efforts in democracies considerably. Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical background and results of related studies. In section 3 we present our data and elaborate on some stylized facts. Section 4 shows results of our new empirical explorations, and section 5 presents robustness tests. The final section concludes.
II. SURVEY OF RELATED LITERATURE
While policy liberalization is often a key to higher overall growth, overcoming opposition of prospective losers from a policy change is at the heart of all political-economic problems of reform implementation. The Political Economy of Reform has produced two prominent ideas, a crisis hypothesis and a strong government-hypothesis. According to the first proposition, a very poor economic performance is supposed to stimulate market-friendly policy changes. In particular, crises make past policy failures visible, induce policy learning, help breaking up interest group resistance, and are therefore conducive to large-scale liberalization (Drazen and Grilli 1993, Krueger 1993) . Second, the institutional framework of policy-making seems to be important. In this respect, political authorities not constrained by democratic checks and balances are said to be more decisive in reform implementation, as they do not depend on a compliance of numerous veto players, reform-opposing vested interests, or in the case of autocratic regimes on electoral majorities. Notably in times of poor economic performance unconstrained or autocratic rulers are expected to respond faster and more effectively Drazen 1991, Velasco 1998 ).
Both lines of reasoning can be challenged theoretically, though. First, hardships of adjustment to economic liberalization will be softened during good times (Bean 1998) . Consequently, political opposition against reform may be weakened, and governments might be more willing to launch reforms in an economic upswing. Second, sustainability of policies and credibility of rulers appear to be a prerequisite for successful reform (e.g. Rodrik 1991) .
Governments knowing that their announcements regarding the future are not credible have no incentive to initiate reforms that only pay off if citizens believe their promises (Keefer 2004) .
Moreover, economic liberalization frequently requires a compensation of prospective losers from reform, even in autocratic regimes. Compensation promises are however always plagued by serious inter-temporal commitment problems (Fernandez and Rodrik 1989 , Dixit and Londregan 1995 , Acemoglu and Robinson 2001 . Recent theoretical studies show that it may be perfectly rational even for unconstrained rulers to refrain from predation and stick to policy promises (Rodrik 2000 , de Figuereido 2002 , Dixit 2003 , Azam et al 2005 . For dictators it is yet hard to build up sufficient reputation to respect compensation agreements (North and Weingast 1989 , Clague et al. 1996 , Escribà-Folch 2007 . Rules of democratic participation and checks and balances may then be good for policy reform, as they serve as an institutional mechanism for peaceful conflict resolution, increase accountability of rulers and foster credibility of political promises, especially in times of crisis (Rodrik 1999) . This would also be more in line with the conjecture that political liberties and economic freedom are fundamentally related (Friedman 1962) .
Both the crisis hypothesis and the impact of the institutional framework of policy-making on economic policy reform have been the subject of a number of empirical studies. Recent investigations (Drazen and Easterly 2001 , Pitlik and Wirth 2003 , Heinemann 2004 , IMF 2004 , Abiad and Mody 2005 , Hoj et al. 2006 , Pitlik 2007 Leonida et al. (2007) , drawing on Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) , find a non-linear relationship between democracy and reform, meaning that both autocratic and fully democratic regimes are more conducive to economic liberalization than semi-democracies.
The papers reviewed so far neglect interaction effects between economic crises and political institutions. This is the subject of a recent paper by Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) . The authors explore implementation of fiscal consolidation and inflation stabilization policies in a panel analysis of OECD-and developing countries. In particular, they find that mounting fiscal deficits or a poor inflation performance increase the probability of reforms, defined as an improvement in budget balance and inflation rates. 
III. DATA AND SOME STYLIZED FACTS
The focus of the paper is on the impact of growth performance, political institutions and their interaction effects on economic policy liberalization in a world-wide sample of developed and developing countries. We do not examine specific policies but instead look at a country's overall policy mix as measured by an aggregate liberalization index. The main reason is that growth performance depends on the interplay of many policies. Poor (or good) growth performance may hence be a driver not of particular reforms but of comprehensive policy changes.
To quantify economic policy reform and the market-friendliness of a country's overall policy mix we make use of the aggregate Economic Freedom of the World-index (efw), compiled by Gwartney, Lawson, and Easterly (2006) . The efw-index quantifies the degree of economic freedom in a country in a range from 0 (not free) to 10 (totally free) points, and covers a time That does not rule out the strong government-hypothesis, however. An explanation could be that unconstrained rulers respond quickly to crises but that a democratic political system is more favorable to sustained economic liberalization in general. Table 1 gives a first impression about potential links between economic policy reform intensity, as measured by a change in the economic freedom-score (∆ efw) over a five-yearperiod, and initial economic freedom, growth performance and average level of democracy. In a first step, we sorted all country-period-observations for all variables into three distinct groups, considered 'high', 'medium', and 'low'. Assignment of labels follows a simple scheme: If an observation is in the 75th percentile of the sample, it is coded 'high', and if it is located in the 25th percentile, it is coded 'low'. Otherwise it is coded 'medium'.
As expected, intensity of policy liberalization ∆ efw is stronger if economic freedom at the start of the period is low, et vice versa. Simple correlation tests show statistical significance of the relationship. This again points to a convergence of economic policies.
In the group of observations with high contemporary growth rates (growth >3.2 percent p.a.), the mean change of economic freedom (∆ efw) is +0.42 points. Bad growth performers show on average an increase of only ∆ efw = +0.13 points. At first glance, this appears to support a hypothesis that good growth performance is also good for reform. However, the reverse may also be the case, if ambitious reforms cause higher growth rates. Using contemporary growth rates we hence face a problem of endogeneity. With respect to per capita growth lagged one period, results seem to support the crisis hypothesis. On average, the group of countries with the worst growth performance observed an increase of the efw-index of +0.39 in the following period. Good growth performers liberalized policies in the subsequent period by +0.1 points. Note, however, that standard deviations within the growth categories are exceptionally high. 2.3 -0.14** Notes: "high" observations are located in the fourth quartile and "low" observations are located in the first quartile of the sample. Asterisks **, and * indicate significance of correlations at the 1 percent level and at the 5 percent level, respectively.
For democracy indicators results are mixed, and there is not too much difference in results using a contemporary or a one period-lagged value. Yet, results for contemporary institutions may be plagued by endogeneity and reverse causality if economic and political liberalization are driven by the same unknown factors. In general it appears that low democracy scores are associated with less liberalization, compared to country observations ranked high on a democracy scale. Again, variation of ∆ efw within categories is considerable.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Model and estimation method
The paper aims at identifying the impact of the interplay of growth performance and political institutions on overall economic policy liberalization. The model to be estimated is given by
where i is a country-index, t represents a respective five-year-time period, efw is the economic freedom-score, gw is a measure of GDP per capita growth performance, pol is one of the institutional variables for democratic constraints (polfree, polity), and X is a vector of control variables to be discussed below. The most popular way in Political Economy to account for fixed effects is a simple within group-transformation (Baltagi 1995, pp. 11-12) . This procedure however makes it impossible to estimate the impact of (almost) time-invariant variables, e.g. a democracy score. Moreover, a within effects-estimator cannot account for level effects of covariates. Important crosscountry information is therefore disregarded. A further econometric problem is related to the dynamic character of the model. Inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the presence of unit fixed effects leads to endogeneity bias in short panels (Nickell 1981) . Reverse causality and endogeneity are also a matter for growth and democracy indicators.
The system GMM-estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002) deals with these problems by employing instrumental variables. 6 System GMM combines equations in first differences with equations in levels, using lagged first differences as instruments in the levels equations and lagged levels as internal instruments in difference equations. 7 Estimates in the next sub-sections are based on a one step-system estimator, with robust standard errors. The validity of additionally included instruments is tested by means of a Hansen-test of overidentifying restrictions. Consistency of estimates requires that error terms are not secondorder serially correlated, so we report P-values of Arellano-Bond-AR(2)-tests. Table 2 reports results of our basic model specifications. Columns (1) to (4) show results where democracy is measured by polfree, in columns (5) to (8) democracy is measured by polity.
Results
We run regressions for a full sample of countries for which all data are available, and a smaller sample, from which 23 high-income OECD-countries are excluded.
As expected, the lagged efw-index is significantly related to contemporary efw-scores. A coefficient of 0.7 indicates considerable policy persistence. Policy reforms usually go slowly, and liberalization is often observed only gradually. GDP per capita shows expected positive signs in all regressions, but most of the time it is not statistically significant. 8 Trade openness seems not related to economic liberalization. Hansen-tests and AR(2)-tests indicate validity of our specifications. Looking at the variables of our special research interest, we find a statistically significant and positive impact of democracy on economic policy liberalization throughout all specifications.
Pre-period GDP per capita growth is not related to reforms in equations (1), (3), (5) and (7), as long as interaction effects with political variables are not included.
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) 
In fully democratic societies (polity = 1), the marginal impact of a 1 percentage point increase of lagged GDP per capita growth is negative (-0.05). In fully autocratic regimes (polity = 0) the impact of higher growth on economic policy liberalization is positive (+0.04). In semi-democratic regimes, with a polity-index about 0.5, good or bad growth performance does not affect policy liberalization in the subsequent period. Hence, the impact of preperiod growth on reform intensity differs by political regime type. Only democratic governments seem to respond to growth crises with a liberalization of economic policies.
Although these effects are statistically significant, they are economically not of overwhelming importance, however.
Using equation (6), for example, we can also derive the impact of democracy on reform as 
Most important in our context is that the positive impact of a democratic regime is reinforced if a country observed bad growth performance in the preceding period. This result contradicts the strong government-hypothesis and is more in line with the expectation that democracy is good for reform, especially in times of economic crises. Results of estimates for a sample without high-income OECD-countries are qualitatively and quantitatively nearly unchanged.
Summing up so far, there appears to be a kind of conditional growth crisis effect on economic policy liberalization. Democracies seem to respond to bad growth performance with more intense reforms than autocratic regimes. A very good growth performance in the preceding period, however, reduces the propensity of democratic regimes to liberalize in the subsequent period.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Alternative measurement of democratic constraints
Any proposed index of democracy should only be interpreted as an ordinal scale (de Haan and Siermann 1996) . To test the robustness of our findings we therefore replace in a first step our normalized democracy scores polfree and polity by simple indicator variables.
Democracy dummy variables are constructed as follows: A country is assigned a '1' if its democracy score (averaged over the time period) exceeds 0.5, otherwise the democracy indicator is '0'. Results are shown in table 3, columns (1) to (4). Again, coefficients of democracy are positive and significant. Pre-period per capita growth is statistically significant only if interactions with democracy dummies are included in the regressions. Hence, results of our analyses in the preceding section are unaffected. A further objection may be that there exists considerable institutional variation both within democracies and within autocracies. Political regimes differ by the strength of institutional constraints on the executive. Presidential or parliamentary regimes, unicameral or bicameral systems, federal or unitary states, or countries with majority voting rule or proportional representation, are characterized by a differing number of veto points although they may observe the same level of democracy. Regardless of the rules of democratic participation, an increasing number of effective veto players can block policy change and reduce decisiveness, or can contribute to commitment to maintaining a given policy and credibility of reforms (Cox and McCubbins 2001, Tsebelis 2002) . In contrast to democracy indicators used beforehand, polconv shows more variation over time, as it depends heavier on specific political conditions in a country. Figure 4 illustrates that the democracy score polfree and the political constraints index polcon in 2004 are correlated positively, but that there is substantial institutional variation within democratic and autocratic regimes with respect to the number of effective political constraints.
Columns (5) and (6) in table 3 report findings of estimates using polconv. All results obtained from the previous set of regressions are qualitatively unchanged. Thus, we are quite confident that our results do not depend on the democracy indicator employed. We also confirmed that our results hold if we include contemporary democratic constraints instead of lagged values (not reported).
Non-linearities in the effects of growth performance
A further point of interest is related to the impact of exceptionally good or bad growth performance on economic policy liberalization. On the one hand, the crisis hypothesis states that only severe downturns increase the likelihood of reform. On the other hand, it may also be the case that only outstandingly high short-run growth rates encourage governments to undertake politically risky reforms that pay off primarily in the longer run. To test these hypotheses, we follow the division of the sample into three distinct groups of high, medium, and low growth, as explained in section 3. While there is no correlation between highgw and the lagged efw-index (r = 0.04), bad growth performance (lowgw) is significant and negatively related to the lagged efw-score (r = -0.3). To avoid problems of multi-collinearity due to an increasing number of interaction terms, the effects of lagged highgw and lowgw dummy and interaction terms on policy liberalization are examined separately. Results are reported in table 4. To economize on space we show only results for polfree and polconv.
Once again, in estimates without interaction of growth performance and political institutions we find no effect of growth performance on policy liberalization. Higher democracy scores and stronger constraints on the executive show a significant and positive relation to the efwindex, thus confirming our previous results (see columns (1), (3), (5), and (7)). Looking at the highgw equations (1) to (4), we again observe that a very good growth performance is helpful to economic reform, but not in fully democratic regimes as indicated by negative coefficients of interaction terms. See columns (2) and (4). Extremely good short run growth performance appears to strengthen reform forces notably in less democratic countries.
In the lowgw equations (5) to (8), we find again a kind of conditional crisis hypothesis. While bad growth performance in the preceding period per se does not show an impact on economic policy reform in the subsequent five years, introducing interaction terms shows that more democratic regimes with stronger institutional restrictions on executive action respond more likely to growth crises with a liberalization of economic policy. In contrast, in autocratic regimes a negative effect of growth crises on policy liberalizations seems to dominate. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Economic policy reform is a conflict-ridden political process. Policies beneficial for society as a whole are often not implemented due to a fierce opposition from politically powerful prospective losers from reforms. In this respect, it is often claimed that a very poor economic performance can help overcome resistance to economic policy liberalization. Furthermore, political authorities not constrained by democratic checks and balances are often supposed to be more decisive and are thus expected to carry out market-friendly policy change in times of crises more easily. Rules of democratic participation and checks and balances may however also be good for policy reform, as they serve as an institutional mechanism for peaceful conflict resolution (Rodrik 1999 ).
In the paper we investigate empirically the interaction between economic growth performance and political institutions in producing free-market reform. Employing 'Economic Freedom of the World'-data as a measure of policy reform for a sample of up to 120 countries over the period 1970-2004 , it is shown that political regime types shape systematically government policy responses to economic growth performance. In line with several other contributions we find that democratic rule is favorable for reform in general. Contrary to conventional wisdom we also find that a bad growth performance is conducive to liberalization not in autocratic political regimes, with only few institutional restrictions for government action, but only in democracies. Thus we observe a kind of conditional growth crisis effect on economic policy liberalization. This result supports Rodrik's notion that democratic institutions are superior in producing a reasonable policy adjustment in times of crisis. Analyses also show that a very good growth performance weakens liberalization efforts in democratic regimes. This is what we would have expected: If short-run growth rates are high, there is no political necessity to change policies, although cost of reform adjustment may be much lower during an economic upswing.
From a political point of view, the most important message of the paper is that there is no need for autocratic rule to implement economic policy reform in times of crises. Democracies not only carry out more liberal economic policies in general, but they are also more responsive to economic growth crises. 
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